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	<title>Comments on: Breaking into an Android password manager &#8211; Theory</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory</link>
	<description>by Gustavo Niemeyer</description>
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		<title>By: Gustavo Niemeyer</title>
		<link>http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory/comment-page-1#comment-72490</link>
		<dc:creator>Gustavo Niemeyer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Dec 2009 01:01:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.labix.org/?p=203#comment-72490</guid>
		<description>It&#039;s good to know that some of the issues are being fixed. That said, these comments above just reinforce my worries about the application, unfortunately.

Unbreakable algorithms, dumb thieves, associating the use of good passwords with &quot;absolute&quot; security (it&#039;s &lt;i&gt;some security at all&lt;/i&gt;, really)...

I can&#039;t provide more insight than I already did in these couple of posts at this point, but I do recommend taking a step back and researching a bit more about security before exposing your name next to a security-oriented software which you&#039;re selling people.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s good to know that some of the issues are being fixed. That said, these comments above just reinforce my worries about the application, unfortunately.</p>
<p>Unbreakable algorithms, dumb thieves, associating the use of good passwords with &#8220;absolute&#8221; security (it&#8217;s <i>some security at all</i>, really)&#8230;</p>
<p>I can&#8217;t provide more insight than I already did in these couple of posts at this point, but I do recommend taking a step back and researching a bit more about security before exposing your name next to a security-oriented software which you&#8217;re selling people.</p>
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		<title>By: Breaking into an Android password manager &#8211; Practice &#171; Labix Blog</title>
		<link>http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory/comment-page-1#comment-72487</link>
		<dc:creator>Breaking into an Android password manager &#8211; Practice &#171; Labix Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Dec 2009 00:38:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.labix.org/?p=203#comment-72487</guid>
		<description>[...] Archives            &#171; Breaking into an Android password manager &#8211; Theory [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Archives            &laquo; Breaking into an Android password manager &#8211; Theory [...]</p>
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		<title>By: gbrors</title>
		<link>http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory/comment-page-1#comment-72483</link>
		<dc:creator>gbrors</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 Dec 2009 23:13:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.labix.org/?p=203#comment-72483</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ve changed the program so that by default no key is stored in any way, but the user must enter the long master key when starting the program (the short unlock key is still an option for people like myself that prefer ease of use to absolute security, guessing that normal thieves would not invest much time trying to get my secrets with brute force attacks). So if the user chooses a good master key and doesn&#039;t use the optional unlock key, then the secrets are really unbreakable (with AES-256). The version 1.1.1 will be published on Sunday.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve changed the program so that by default no key is stored in any way, but the user must enter the long master key when starting the program (the short unlock key is still an option for people like myself that prefer ease of use to absolute security, guessing that normal thieves would not invest much time trying to get my secrets with brute force attacks). So if the user chooses a good master key and doesn&#8217;t use the optional unlock key, then the secrets are really unbreakable (with AES-256). The version 1.1.1 will be published on Sunday.</p>
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		<title>By: ben</title>
		<link>http://blog.labix.org/2009/12/01/breaking-into-an-android-password-manager-theory/comment-page-1#comment-72433</link>
		<dc:creator>ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Dec 2009 21:47:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.labix.org/?p=203#comment-72433</guid>
		<description>I am interested then as to what the best password manager for android would be then? Google Secrets, KeePassDroid, SplashID, etc.?

Thanks for pointing this out either way and hope the Hero is treating you well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am interested then as to what the best password manager for android would be then? Google Secrets, KeePassDroid, SplashID, etc.?</p>
<p>Thanks for pointing this out either way and hope the Hero is treating you well.</p>
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